Cost Effective Rumor Containment in Social Networks by Kotnis, Bhushan & Kuri, Joy
ar
X
iv
:1
40
3.
63
15
v2
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  2
7 A
pr
 20
14
1
Cost Effective Rumor Containment in Social
Networks
Bhushan Kotnis and Joy Kuri
Dept. of Electronic Systems Engineering, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. {bkotnis,kuri}@dese.iisc.ernet.in
Abstract—The spread of rumors through social media and
online social networks can not only disrupt the daily lives of
citizens, but also result in loss of life and property. A rumor
spreads when individuals, who are unable decide the authenticity
of the information, mistake the rumor as genuine information and
pass it to their acquaintances. We propose a solution where a set
of individuals, characterized by their degree in the social network,
are trained and provided resources to help them distinguish a
rumor from genuine information. By formulating an optimization
problem we calculate the set of individuals, who must undergo
training, and the quality of training that minimizes the expected
training cost and ensures an upper bound on the size of the
rumor outbreak. Our primary contribution is, that although the
optimization problem turns out to be non linear, we show that the
problem is equivalent to solving a set of linear programs. This
result also allows us to solve the problem of minimizing the size
of rumor outbreak for a given cost budget. The solution of the
optimization problem demonstrates that increasing the number
of trained individuals is better than improving the quality of
training. Furthermore, the optimum set of trained individuals
displays a pattern which can be converted to an implementable
heuristic. These results can prove to be very useful to social
planners and law enforcement agencies for preventing dangerous
rumors and misinformation epidemics.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen a dramatic increase in the usage of
online social networking (OSN) and microblogging services
[1] like Facebook, Google+, Twitter, etc. Apart from their
usefulness in helping individuals keep in touch, they are
increasingly being used for disseminating information about
events happing in real time [2]. Due to the proliferation of
smart phones, individuals can easily capture the unfolding of
events in real time and can share it with others via social media
instantaneously. Social media played a key role in sharing of
information in the immediate aftermath of: the Fukushima
nuclear accident [3], hurricane Sandy [4] and the Boston
marathon bombings [5]. Online social networks, microblog-
ging, and short messaging services can be extremely useful in
aiding the dissemination of time critical and potentially life
saving information during large scale human emergencies.
However, along with useful information, OSN can also aid
the spread of rumors, and can even facilitate the spread of a
dangerous misinformation epidemic [4]. Since these services
operate in a decentralized manner, i.e., absence of a central
authority for guaranteeing the authenticity of the information,
careless individuals can accidentally initiate and propagate
rumors. Furthermore, the distributed nature of social media
can be exploited by malicious agents for spreading dangerous
misinformation epidemics. This problem has been a growing
concern for administrative authorities [6]. In the recent past,
with the goal of preventing the spread of rumors, the Indian
Government ordered cell phone operators to impose a limit on
the number of text messages that can be sent by any individual
[7]. However, such ad-hoc measures are costly and also not
very effective. In this article we propose a cost effective rumor
prevention mechanism which provides guarantees on the size
of the rumor outbreak.
The problem of maximizing the spread of information in
social networks is well known [8–10]. Approaches such as
calculating the optimal (or approximately optimal) set of seed
nodes [8, 9, 11] and optimal control [12–14] have been pro-
posed. The reverse problem of limiting the spread of rumors
has also received some attention and is termed as least cost
rumor blocking problem [15], misinformation containment
problem [16], influence blocking maximization problem [17].
The predominant approach used to address this problem is
to identify a set of target seed nodes who will spread an
‘anti-rumor’ [15–19] to combat the rumor. The problem of
limiting the spread of virus or malware in computer networks
is analogous to the problem of limiting the spread of rumors,
and studies [20, 21] have used optimal control techniques for
achieving the same. However, the optimal control solution is
difficult to implement as it requires a centralized real time
controller.
Our approach, which involves training nodes to help them
distinguish between the rumor and true information, is similar
to link blocking in [22] and node removal strategy in[23–25].
However, apart from [24] most studies do not consider the cost
of blocking links or nodes. The problem of minimizing the cost
of immunizing nodes for preventing the spread of a disease
(or rumor) was studied in [24] and it was shown to be an
NP-Hard problem. Their model assumed perfect immunization
(immunized node cannot transmit a rumor), while our model
allows for partial immunization (immunized node can transmit
a rumor). In this study we formulate an optimization problem
in which, apart from the set of nodes to be immunized, the
immunization quality is also a control variable, and which
also incorporates cost budget constraints and constraint on
the number of immunized nodes. Thus, the problem we are
considering is more richer and general than the one in [24].
The straightforward approach of calculating the set of nodes
which minimizes the cost and ensures prevention of rumor
outbreak suffers from a combinatorial explosion problem. For
the purpose of analytical tractability we characterize nodes
solely based on their degree. Although a degree centrality
based approach may not be optimal, it has been shown to work
2very well in scale free networks [23, 25–27]. Furthermore, a
solution based on the degree based characterization of nodes
is very simple to implement.
We propose a method in which a set of individuals, charac-
terized by their degree, are trained to distinguish rumors from
useful information. Such training may also involve allocating
costly resources, such as access to security cameras, drone or
satellite photography, or access to a group of experts which
help individuals make the correct decision. Thus, training
individuals is a costly affair. We seek to identify the set of
individuals to be trained, that minimizes the expected training
cost and prevents a rumor outbreak by formulating and solving
an optimization problem. We also address the problem of
minimizing the size of the rumor outbreak for a given cost
budget.
Our model assumes two types of individuals viz. untrained
and trained, and they are connected to one another through
a social network. Both, the untrained and the trained are
unable to distinguish between the rumor with certainty, how-
ever trained individuals can distinguish a rumor from an
information better then the untrained ones. Individuals are
characterized by their degree, and the cost of training is
assumed to be proportional to their degree. The Independent
Cascade (IC) model discussed in [8] is used to model the
rumor propagation.
For a given set of trained individuals, we first calculate the
size of the rumor outbreak using network percolation theory,
and then find the set of nodes which 1. minimizes the cost
for a given outbreak size and 2. minimizes outbreak size for a
given cost budget. Both the optimization problems are found
to be a non linear. Our primary contribution is, that we show
that the nonlinear problem can be addressed by solving a set
of linear programs. Furthermore, we discover that the set of
individuals which need to be trained displays an interesting
pattern: it turns out that when, the cost is linear in terms of
node degree, low degree individuals are more important than
high degree individuals for the purpose of rumor prevention.
Our contributions are summarized as follows :
• We calculate the size of a rumor outbreak using bond
percolation theory.
• We formulate two optimization problems viz. minimize
cost subject to limit on outbreak probability and minimize
outbreak probability subject to a budget on the cost. The
two problems turn out to be non linear programs and we
show that they can be solved by solving a set of linear
programs.
• We solve the problems for sub-linear, linear and a super
linear cost structure. For the linear case the solution
provides useful insights such as: when more resources
are available it is best to increase the quantity of trained
individuals than increasing the quality of training. Also,
the optimum set of trained individuals follows a pat-
tern which can be easily converted to an implementable
heuristic.
The article is organized as follows. The model is described
in Sec. II, the analysis in Sec. III, the main results in Sec. IV
and the conclusions in Sec. V.
II. MODEL
We divide the total population of N individuals into two
types: the untrained (type 1) and the trained (type 2). These
individuals are connected with one another through a social
network, which is represented by an undirected graph (net-
work). Nodes represent individuals while a link embodies the
communication pathways between individuals. For the sake of
analytical tractability we make the following approximation.
Instead of analyzing the adjacency matrix of the network,
we obtain statistical information about the social network by
calculating its degree distribution (probability that a randomly
chosen node has k neighbors). We then generate a synthetic
network with the obtained degree distribution using the con-
figuration model procedure [28]. A sequence of N integers,
called the degree sequence, is obtained by sampling the degree
distribution. Thus each node is associated with an integer
which is assumed to be the number of half edges or stubs
associated with the node. Assuming that the total number of
stubs is even, each stub is chosen at random and joined with
another randomly selected stub. The process continues until all
stubs are exhausted. Self loops and multiple edges are possible,
but the number of such self loops and multiple edges goes to
zero as N →∞ with high probability. The network obtained
by this process is termed as configuration model. We assume
that N is large but finite.
Let P (k) be the degree distribution of the social network.
Individuals can receive a messages which may be benign or
malicious (rumors). We assume that the rumor deals with a
single and specific topic, and hence we represent it as a data
message, i.e., rumor message R. We propose an approach
where the social planners train individuals and provide them
resources such as access to real time photography from se-
curity cams, or access to opinions from a group of experts,
for helping them recognize rumors from true information. We
assume that all trained individuals receive the same quality
of training and resources. Let φ(k) be the proportion of
individuals with k degrees recruited for training.
We assume that initially a randomly chosen individual acts
as a seed and transmits the R message to all its neighbors
with probability 1. However, the individual who receives this
message cannot recognize with certainty if it is a rumor, and
hence she makes a guess about the nature of the message. She
transmits the message to all her neighbors only if she believes
that it is not a rumor. If she thinks that it is a rumor then she
does not transmit it to any of her neighbors. An individual who
receives the message and decides to spread it to her neighbors,
does so only once and such a person is termed as a believer.
An individual who has not received the message is termed as
a nonbeliever. This models the scenario where an individual
may hear about an event and report it to all her friends based
on her gut feeling about the nature of the message. A believer
cannot revert back to being a nonbeliever, while a nonbeliever
who receives a message and concludes its a rumor is assumed
to remain a nonbeliever. We call he link connecting a believer
to an untrained node as a type 1 link, and the link connecting
a believer to a trained node as a type 2 link.
Let H0 be the hypothesis that the received message is not
3R, while H1 be the hypothesis that received message is R.
Thus an individual who receives a rumor message transmits
it with the probability Pr{H0|it is a rumor message}, i.e., it
is the probability of the event that she fails to identify the
true nature of the message. Let T1 and T2 be the probability
of misclassifying the rumor as information for untrained and
trained individuals respectively. We refer to T1 as the force
of rumor. Due to the training T2 < T1. However, no amount
of training can accurately identify the nature of the message,
hence T1, T2 ∈ (0, 1).
We present the following scenario as an illustrative example.
An untrained individual A receives a rumor message, she
makes an error in identifying it as a rumor, and hence passes
on this message to all her connections. This event happens with
probability T1. A trained individual B, receives this message
from A, but unlike A she correctly identifies the message
as a rumor and hence does not send it to her connections.
This event happens with probability 1 − T2. The proportion
of believers, after the process terminates, is termed as size
of the outbreak. This model is also termed as the independent
cascade model [8]. The process can also be viewed as a rumor
propagating through links when they are active. Thus a type 1
link is active with probability T1 while a type 2 link is active
with probability T2. These are also called bond occupation
probabilities [29].
III. ANALYSIS
We use bond percolation theory to analyze the rumor
spreading process. Let P (k′ | k) be the probability of encoun-
tering a node of degree k′ by traversing a randomly chosen
link from a node of degree k. In other words, P (k′ | k) is
the probability that a node with degree k has a neighbor with
degree k′. For a network generated by configuration model,
P (k′ | k) = k′P (k′)/ < k > [30], which is independent of k,
where < ki > is the ith moment of P (k).
Let q be the probability of encountering a trained node by
traversing a randomly chosen link from a node of degree
k. Therefore, q =
∞∑
k′=1
Pr(Neighboring node is trained |
neighboring node has degree k′) · Pr(Neighboring node has
degree k′ | original node has degree k).
q =
1
< k >
∞∑
k=1
kφ(k)P (k)
The probability that a randomly chosen node has k1
untrained and k2 trained neighbors = P (k1, k2) =∞∑
k:k=k1+k2
Pr(k1, k2 |node has degree k)P (k).
The event that a given node has degree k, is independent
of the event that another node, having a common neighbor
with the given node, has degree k′. This is true since the
degree sequence is generated by independent samples from the
distribution. The probability that a node is trained, is a function
of its degree, hence the event that A is trained (untrained) is
independent of the event that B is trained (untrained). This
allows us to write:
Generating function Distribution
G(u1, u2) P (k1, k2)
F (u1, u2) Q(k1, k2)
G˜(u1, u2) P˜ (k˜1, k˜2)
F˜ (u1, u2) Q˜(k˜1, k˜2)
H˜i(u1, u2) No. of untrained and trained nodes,
who are believers, in a component
reached from a type i link.
J˜i(u1, u2) No. of untrained and trained nodes
who are believers, in a component
reached from a node i.
J˜(u1, u2) No. of untrained and trained nodes
who are believers, in a component
reached from a randomly chosen node.
TABLE I
LIST OF PROBABILITY GENERATING FUNCTIONS.
P (k1, k2) =
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
qk2(1 − q)k1P (k1 + k2)
Let Q(k) be the excess degree distribution, i.e., the degree
distribution of a node arrived at by following a randomly
chosen link without counting that link. For the configuration
model Q(k) = (k + 1)P (k + 1)/ < k >. Let Q(k1, k2) be
the excess degree distribution for connections to untrained and
trained nodes.
Q(k1, k2) =
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
qk2(1 − q)k1Q(k1 + k2)
Let P˜ (k˜1, k˜2) and Q˜(k˜1, k˜2) be the distribution and the
excess distribution of the number of untrained and trained
neighbors who are believers. In other words the distribution
and the excess distribution of type i occupied links.
P˜ (k˜1, k˜2) =
∞∑
k1=k˜1
∞∑
k2=k˜2
P (k1, k2)
2∏
i=1
(
ki
k˜i
)
T
k˜i
i (1− Ti)
ki−k˜i
Q˜(k˜1, k˜2) =
∞∑
k1=k˜1
∞∑
k2=k˜2
Q(k1, k2)
2∏
i=1
(
ki
k˜i
)
T
k˜i
i (1− Ti)
ki−k˜i
The probability generating functions, G(u) =
∞∑
k=0
ukP (k),
for the distributions discussed above are listed in Table I.
Now, G˜(u1, u2) is given by
∞∑
k˜1,k˜2
uk˜11 u
k˜2
2
∑
k1=k˜1
∑
k2=k˜2
P (k1, k2)
2∏
i=1
(
ki
k˜i
)
T k˜ii (1− Ti)
ki−k˜i
=
∞∑
k1,k2
(1 + (u1 − 1)T1)
k1(1 + (u2 − 1)T2)
k2P (k1, k2)
= G (1 + (u1 − 1)T1, 1 + (u2 − 1)T2)
Similarly, F˜ (u1, u2) = F (1 + (u1 − 1)T1, 1 + (u2 − 1)T2)
A component is a small cluster of nodes who have become
believers due to rumor propagation. By small we mean that
the cluster is finite and does not scale with the network size.
However, at the phase transition the average size of the cluster
diverges (as N →∞). A rumor outbreak is possible only when
the phase transition threshold is crossed and the average size
4Fig. 1. (Color Online) Illustration of components. The red boxes represent the
components reached by type 1 link while green boxes represent components
reached by a type 2 link. A trained node is represented by a green circle
while a red circle represents an untrained node.
of the cluster diverges. In this regime the component is termed
as a giant connected component (GCC) and it grows with the
network size. Let H˜i(u1, u2) be the generating function of the
distribution of the number of untrained and trained nodes in
a component which is arrived at from a type i link, i.e., edge
whose end is type i node. The component must contain at least
one node of type 1 or type 2. Let J˜i(u1, u2) and J˜(u1, u2) be
the generating functions of the distribution of the number of
untrained and trained nodes in a component arrived at from
node i and a randomly chosen node respectively.
The probability of encountering closed loops in finite cluster
is O(N−1) [29] which can be neglected for large N . The tree
like structure of the cluster allows us to write the size of the
component encountered by traversing a link as the sum of the
size of components encountered after traversing the links of
the end node. This is illustrated in Fig. 1. Since, the size of
the components along different links are mutually independent
(absence of loops) we can write the following equation.
H˜i(u1, u2) = ui
∞∑
k1,k2
H˜k11 (u1, u2)H˜
k2
2 (u1, u2)Q˜(k˜1, k˜2)
= uiF˜ (H˜1(u1, u2), H˜2(u1, u2))
Which can also be written as
H˜i(u1, u2) =
uiF
(
1 + (H˜1(u1, u2)− 1)T1, 1 + (H˜2(u1, u2)− 1)T2
)
(1)
The multiple ui results from the end node of the link while
Q˜(k˜1, k˜2) is the excess distribution of the occupied type i
links. Similarly, J˜(u1, u2) can be expressed as :
J˜i(u1, u2) = ui
∞∑
k1,k2
H˜k11 (u1, u2)H˜
k2
2 (u1, u2)P˜ (k˜1, k˜2)
= uiG˜(H˜1(u1, u2), H˜2(u1, u2))
J˜(u1, u2) = (1− p)J˜1(u1, u2) + pJ˜2(u1, u2)
where p is the probability of selecting a trained node, p =
∞∑
k=1
P (k)φ(k).
The following theorem describes the phase transition con-
ditions required for a rumor outbreak and the size of the such
a rumor outbreak.
Theorem III.1. The condition required for a small cluster
to become a giant connected component is given by: ν˜ ≥ 1,
where
ν˜ = T1
∞∑
k1,k2
k1Q(k1, k2) + T2
∞∑
k1,k2
k2Q(k1, k2)
and the size of the giant connected component is given by
1− ψ,
ψ =
∞∑
k1,k2
(1 + (u∗ − 1)T1)
k1(1 + (u∗ − 1)T2)
k2P (k1, k2)
where u∗ is the solution of the fixed point equation
u =
∞∑
k1,k2
(1 + (u− 1)T1)
k1 (1 + (u− 1)T2)
k2Q(k1, k2)
Proof: Let < s1 > and < s2 > be the average number of
untrained and trained nodes in the component. The expected
number of nodes in the component, < s >, is given by:
< s > =< s1 > + < s2 >
=
∂
∂u1
J˜(u1, u2)
∣∣∣∣
u=1
+
∂
∂u2
J˜(u1, u2)
∣∣∣∣
u=1
After differentiating and simplifying, < s1 > can be written
as:
< s1 >= (1− p)+ < k˜1 > H˜
′
1(1, 1)+ < k˜2 > H˜
′
2(1, 1)
where < k˜i >=
∞∑
k1,k2
k˜iP˜ (k˜1, k˜2) and
H˜
′
i(1, 1) =
∂
∂u1
H˜i(u1, u2)
∣∣∣∣
u=1
H˜
′
i(1, 1) can be obtained by differentiating equation (1).
H˜
′
1(1, 1) = 1 + T1k¯1H˜
′
1(1, 1) + T2k¯2H˜
′
2(1, 1)
H˜
′
2(1, 1) = T1k¯1H˜
′
1(1, 1) + T2k¯2H˜
′
2(1, 1)
where k¯i =
∞∑
k1,k2
kiQ(k1, k2). Solving the two simultaneous
equations we obtain H˜ ′1(1, 1) = 1−T2k¯21−T1k¯1−T2k¯2 and H˜
′
2(1, 1) =
T1k¯1
1−T1k¯1−T2k¯2 . Substituting in the expression for < s1 > we
get.
< s1 >= (1 − p) +
< k˜1 > (1− T2k¯2)+ < k˜2 > T1k¯1
1− T1k¯1 − T2k¯2
One can similarly show that:
< s2 >= p+
< k˜1 > T2k¯2+ < k˜2 > (1− T1k¯1)
1− T1k¯1 − T2k¯2
Therefore,
< s >= 1 +
< k˜1 > + < k˜2 >
1− k¯1 − k¯2
5Thus, when k¯1 + k¯2 ≥ 1, < s > is no longer finite, it morphs
into a giant connected component, or in other words there is
a rumor outbreak.
Assume that a giant connected component of exists (ν˜ ≥ 1).
For any given node let ui be the probability that one of its
type i links does not lead to the giant connecting component.
The probability that a randomly chosen node is not a part of
the GCC is given by
ψ =
∞∑
k˜1,k˜2
uk11 u
k2
2 P (k1, k2)
Now, ui can be written as Pr(link is not occupied ) + Pr(link
is occupied and the neighbor is not connected to the GCC).
Mathematically this can be written as :
u1 = 1− T1 + T1
∞∑
k1,k2
uk11 u
k2
2 Q(k1, k2)
u2 = 1− T2 + T2
∞∑
k1,k2
uk11 u
k2
2 Q(k1, k2)
Simplifying we obtain, (u1 − 1)/T1 = (u2 − 1)/T2. Let u :=
(u1 − 1)/T1 + 1. Hence, ui = 1 + (u− 1)Ti. Note that ui is
lower bounded by 1− Ti and upper bounded by 1 and hence
0 ≤ u ≤ 1. Substituting this in above equations we obtain the
desired result:
ψ =
∞∑
k1,k2
(1 + (u− 1)T1)
k1(1 + (u− 1)T2)
k2P (k1, k2)
where u must satisfy
u =
∞∑
k1,k2
(1 + (u− 1)T1)
k1(1 + (u− 1)T2)
k2Q(k1, k2)
The size of the outbreak can now be used for formulating
the optimization problem. The size of the outbreak can also
be interpreted as the probability that a randomly chosen
individual is a believer, or as the probability of a rumor
outbreak [29].
IV. RESULTS
Recruiting, training and equipping individuals with re-
sources to distinguish between rumor and benign message is
costly. A high degree individual is more likely to receive a
message than a low degree individual. For a trained individual,
reception of a message translates into usage of costly resources
for making a decision. Hence, we assume that the cost incurred
in training an individual is an increasing function of its degree
k. Increasing the quality of training or equivalently, decreasing
T2, results in decrease of the outbreak probability 1−ψ. This
is shown graphically in Fig. 2 and analytically in Lemma A.4
detailed in the Appendix. Increasing the quality of training by
allocating more resources should result in a higher cost, hence
the cost must be a decreasing function of T2. Let c(k, T2) be
the cost of training a node with degree k. The average cost is
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Fig. 2. (Color Online) Outbreak probability 1−ψ vs. T1 for various values
of T2
given by
∞∑
k=1
c(k, T2)Pr(node is selected for training | node
has degree k)P (k) =
∞∑
k=1
c(k, T2)φ(k)P (k). The average
number of trained individuals is given by
∞∑
k=1
φ(k)P (k).
We formulate two optimization problems, viz., one which
minimizes cost while enforcing an upper bound on the out-
break probability, and the other which minimizes the outbreak
probability for a given cost budget.
A. Cost minimization problem
Providing guarantees on rumor outbreak at a minimum cost
is appropriate in scenarios where the rumor spread may result
in loss of life and property, such as rumors that incite commu-
nal violence. The guarantee on rumor outbreak probability is
written as a constraint to the optimization problem. The cost
c(φ, T2) is minimized subject to 1−ψ ≤ δ where γ ∈ [0, 1].
If γ = 0, the constraint becomes ν˜ ≤ 1, as γ = 0 implies
ψ = 1 which is the same as ν˜ ≤ 1. This is a non linear
optimization problem and the non linearity arises from the
outbreak probability expression.
For a fixed T2, the constraint 1−ψ ≤ δ is non linear in φ.
For a fixed T2, the following theorem allows us to write the
non linear constraint as a linear constraint. The proof follows
from Lemmas A.1, A.2 and A.3 detailed in the Appendix.
Theorem IV.1. If T2 < T1, for ψ ∈ [0, 1), then ψ is strictly
increasing with respect to q, i.e, dψ
dq
> 0 for all q ∈ [0, 1] and
ν˜ is strictly decreasing with respect to q, i.e, dν˜
dq
< 0, ∀ q ∈
[0, 1], where q = 1
<k>
∞∑
k=1
kφ(k)P (k).
Since, dψ
dq
> 0, the outbreak probability constraint can be
written as 1
<k>
∞∑
k=1
kφ(k)P (k) ≥ q∗, where ψ(q) |q=q∗ =
1− γ.
The optimization problem is described by:
6minimize
φ,T2
∞∑
k=1
c(k, T2)φ(k)P (k)
subject to:
1
< k >
∞∑
k=1
kφ(k)P (k) ≥ q∗
∞∑
k=1
φ(k)P (k) ≤ B
Tl ≤ T2 ≤ Tu
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1
(2)
B is the upper bound on the average number of individuals that
can be trained, B ∈ [0, 1]. Tl > 0 is the upper bound on the
quality of training and Tu < T1 is the lower bound. The above
problem is non linear in T2 as q∗ is a non linear function of
T2, however, for a fixed T2 it is a linear program. We convert
the problem to a set of linear programs by discretizing T2 and
formulating a linear program for each value of T2. We obtain
an approximate global minimum by comparing the minimas
obtained by solving the set of linear programs.
The optimization problem described above may not be
feasible for all values of T1 and for all possible degree
distributions P (k). Here is an example of a scenario where the
constraint set is empty. Assume B = 1, the problem becomes
infeasible if 1 − ψ ≥ γ when T2 is at the minimum possible
value (Tl) and q = 1 , i.e., all individuals are trained. However,
if the constraint on the quality of training is relaxed, Tl = 0,
then an optimal feasible solution will always exists as T2 can
be pushed arbitrarily close to 0 to ensure that the outbreak
probability constraint is not violated.
1) Linear cost: For the sake of illustration we study the
case where the cost is directly proportional to the degree and
inversely proportional to T 2, i.e., c(k, T 2) = k
T2
. Assuming
feasibility of the problem, we use a numerical linear pro-
gramming solver to arrive at the solution. Since many social
networks are scale free [1, 31], we assume that the network
degree distribution is a power law P (k) ∝ k−α with α = 2.5
and a population size of 2000. We use the algorithm detailed
in [32] for generating the configuration model while the power
law distribution was generated using the code supplied in [33].
The optimum value of T2 for varying force of rumor, T1, is
shown in Fig. 3, while Fig. 4 shows the optimum proportion
of trained individuals for varying T1. For the B = 1 scenario,
as the force of rumor, T1, increases, the optimum T2 rises
and saturates. Notice that when T2 saturates the proportion of
trained nodes hits 1, i.e., all nodes are trained. Since all the
nodes are trained, increase in T1 does not have any effect on
T2. This behavior is observed because the cost of increasing
the quality (reducing T2) is higher than the cost of training
individuals.
When B = 0.7, the proportion of trained nodes cannot
exceed 0.7, and hence after the proportion of individuals hit
0.7, increasing the quality of training (reducing T2) is the only
available choice to combat the increase in T1. When T1 is
small (≤ 0.4), φ = 0, thus the cost is 0, and hence T2 can
take any arbitrary value.
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Fig. 3. (Color Online) Optimum value of T2 vs. T1. Parameters: γ =
0.1 Tl = 0, Tu = T1
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Fig. 4. (Color Online) Proportion of Trained Individuals vs. T1. Parameters:
γ = 0.1, Tl = 0, Tu = T1
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Fig. 5. (Color Online) φ for various values of T1. Parameters : γ =
0.1, B = 0.7 Tl = 0, Tu = T1. Green squares : T1 = 0.4, magenta
triangles : T1 = 0.45, red stars : T1 = 0.5, blue circles : T1 = 0.6, black
hats : T1 = 0.7.
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Fig. 6. (Color Online) φ vs T1 for various cost functions. Parameters:
γ = 0.1, T1 = 0.7, Tl = 0, Tu = T1 B = 0.7
Fig. 5 shows φ for various values of T1. As T1 increases
the proportion of trained low degree nodes increases much
faster than the proportion of trained high degree nodes. A
clear pattern is seen, the proportion of high degree nodes that
need to be trained is more or less constant with respect to T1,
while the trained low degree nodes are extremely sensitive
to T1. Thus, one can formulate a simple policy of training
a fixed proportion (say 40 − 60%) of high degree nodes,
and recruit low degree nodes depending one the estimated
severity of the rumor T1. In other words, after fixing the
proportion of high degree individuals that are trained, if the
social planners perceive that a particular rumor message can
be easily identified by individuals then they need not train a
whole lot of low degree nodes. Thus, for a cost function linear
in k, low degree nodes are more important than high degree
nodes.
2) Comparison of linear,sub-linear and super-linear cost
models: To understand the effect of cost structure on the opti-
mum set of trained individuals, we study three cost structures,
viz., a cost function sub linear in k, c(k, T2) =
√
k
T2
, linear in
k c(k, T2) =
k
T2
and super linear c(k, T2) = k
1.5
T2
.
The profile of optimum trained individuals for linear, sub
linear and super linear cost functions is illustrated in Fig. 6. In
sub linear case only the high degree nodes are trained while
in the super linear case only the low degree nodes are trained,
while the linear case hits a middle ground between the sub
linear and super linear cases.
The reduction of outbreak probability obtained by training a
high degree node is much more than that obtained by training
a low degree node. In the super linear case since there is a
significant cost on training high degree nodes, large number
of low degree nodes are trained. In the sub linear case we
observe the exact opposite behavior. A scale free network has
a large number of low degree nodes compared to high degree
nodes, hence the number of trained individuals in the super
linear case must be much higher than the sub linear case, this
is can be seen in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 7. (Color Online) Proportion of Trained Individuals vs. T1. Parameters:
γ = 0.1, Tl = 0, Tu = T1, B = 0.7
B. Outbreak probability minimization problem
We now look at the problem of minimizing the outbreak
probability in a resource constrained scenario. More, specifi-
cally we study a scenario where the cost budget is finite. Thus
the outbreak probability 1 − ψ must be minimized subject to
a cost constraint. Like the previous optimization problem this
is also a non linear program. Since dψ
dq
> 0 for a fixed T2,
maximizing q is equivalent to minimizing 1 − ψ. Thus for a
fixed T2 the problem is equivalent to a linear program. We
discretize T2 and compute the optimum q,φ for each T2 by
solving the linear program. Thus, a set of outbreak probabil-
ities is obtained for each optimum q and the corresponding
T2. The approximate global minimum, optimum φ and T2 is
found by obtaining the minimum outbreak probability from
the set and the corresponding q,φ and T2. The optimization
problem for a fixed T2 is given by:
maximize
φ
∞∑
k=1
kφ(k)P (k)
subject to:
∞∑
k=1
c(k, T2)φ(k)P (k) ≤ C
∞∑
k=1
φ(k)P (k) ≤ B
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1
(3)
1) Linear cost: Like the previous problem we study the
case where the cost is a linear function of k and is inversely
proportional to T2. We assume that the network degree distri-
bution is a power law P (k) ∝ k−α with α = 2.5 and a total
population size of 2000.
Fig. 8 illustrates the reduction in the outbreak probability
with increase in cost budget C for various values of T1. Fig. 9
shows the expected number of trained individuals for a varying
cost budget while Fig. 10 displays the corresponding optimum
values of T2. When the total number of trained individuals hit
the limit B, increasing the cost budget leads to a decrease in
T2. Thus, given an increasing budget, we can conclude that it is
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Fig. 8. (Color Online) Outbreak Probability vs. Cost Budget C for various
T1. Parameters: B = 0.7, Tl = 0, Tu = T1
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Fig. 9. (Color Online) Proportion of Trained Individuals vs. Cost Budget C
for various T1. Parameters: B = 0.7, Tl = 0, Tu = T1
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Fig. 10. (Color Online) T2 vs. Cost Budget C for various T1. Parameters:
B = 0.7, Tl = 0, Tu = T1
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Fig. 11. (Color Online) φ for various values of cost budget C. Parameters
: B = 0.7, Tl = 0, Tu = T1.
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Fig. 12. (Color Online) φ for various values of cost budget C. Parameters
: B = 0.7, Tl = 0, Tu = T1.
better to increase the quantity of trained individuals rather than
the quality of training, and only when increasing the quantity
is no longer possible, the quality should be increased.
In Fig. 11 we plot φ for various values of C. Similar to the
previous optimization problem, low degree nodes are seen to
be more sensitive to changes in C than high degree nodes.
2) Comparison of linear,sub-linear and super-linear cost
models: Like the previous problem, we study the effect of
sub linear and super linear on the solution of the optimization
problem.
Fig. 12 which plots the profile of trained individuals for
varying cost budget C is very similar to Fig. 6 in the cost
minimization problem subsection, i.e., in the super linear case
low degree nodes are trained while in the sub linear case high
degree nodes are trained. However, the optimum T2 for the
super linear case displays an interesting behavior. As shown in
Fig. 13, the optimization problem involving super linear costs
hits the limit on the number of trained individuals (B = 0.7)
much before the optimization problem with sub linear costs.
One would expect that, if the cost budget is increased beyond
this point T2 should decrease. However, Fig. 14 shows that T2
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Fig. 13. (Color Online) Proportion of Trained Individuals vs. T1. Parameters:
B = 0.7, T1 = 0.6, Tl = 0, Tu = T1
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Fig. 14. (Color Online) Optimum value of T2 vs. T1 for various cost
functions. Parameters: B = 0.7, T1 = 0.6, Tl = 0, Tu = T1
decreases very slowly for the super linear case in comparison
to the sub linear case. The reason for this behavior is not
entirely clear.
C. A note on the information spreading problem
The analysis and results discussed in this article can also
be applied to address the problem of spreading information
in a social network. Social planners, health campaigners, or
political parties may want to ensure the dissemination of in-
formation in the social network at minimal cost. Incentivizing
individuals for spreading information can help in disseminat-
ing the message to a large number of people. Redefine T1 as
the probability an ordinary individual shares the message, and
T2 as the probability that an recruited individual shares the
message (T2 > T1). Let φ(k) be the proportion of recruited
individuals with degree k, and c(k, T 2) be the recruitment
cost.
An optimization problem for minimizing the cost guaran-
teeing the size of the information outbreak 1 − ψ ≥ γ, or
maximizing the outbreak size 1−ψ for a given cost budget can
be formulated. Theorem IV.1 can be easily extended to include
the scenario T2 > T1. In this case we would obtain dψdq < 0
and dν˜
dq
> 0. This would enable one to solve the information
spreading problem by solving a set of linear programs.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this article we studied the problem of containing rumors
in a social network. More specifically, we considered a sce-
nario where individuals are unable to distinguish between the
rumor and the information message, and proposed a training
mechanism to recruit and train individuals. By using network
percolation theory we calculated the size of the rumor outbreak
and the conditions for the occurrence of such outbreaks.
We then formulated an optimization problem for minimizing
the expected recruitment and training cost while ensuring
prevention of rumors. The optimization problem turned out to
be nonlinear, and we showed that for a fixed quality of training,
T2, the problem becomes a linear programming problem. This
enabled us to solve the general problem by solving a set of
linear programs. As an illustration we studied the solutions
of cost functions which are sub-linear, linear and super-linear
in node degree k. For the linear case, the solution exhibited
interesting properties, such as the sensitivity of low degree
nodes to the intensity of rumor and the cost budget and the
lack of sensitivity of high degree nodes to the same. In the
sub linear case it is best to train low degree nodes while for
the super linear it is exactly the opposite: the high degree
nodes. However, in both sub and super linear case the training
profile was found to be largely deterministic. In all the cases
the solutions exhibited patterns which can be easily converted
to an implementable heuristic. Additionally, our results can be
easily extended to address the information spreading problem.
More importantly, our results have implications on rumor
control policies. Many Governments are concerned about
dangerous rumor outbreaks and misinformation epidemics
propagated on OSNs, and some, like the Indian Government
and the Chinese Government have drafted policies [6, 7] for
controlling them. However, these policies are drafted in an ad
hoc manner. Furthermore they are not well studied and they
do not work [7]. In contrast, our approach gives guarantees
on the outbreak size, uses the minimal possible resources and
can be implemented in the form of a heuristic.
In this article we have assumed that only the rumor, modeled
as a single message, is circulated in the social network. There
may be situations where messages, other than the primary
rumor message circulate in the social network. These messages
may interact with the primary rumor message either helping or
hindering its spread. Analysis of a model which incorporates
such interactions may reveal novel approaches for combating
rumor outbreaks. We leave this interesting problem to the
future.
APPENDIX
Theorem IV.1 is established using Lemma A.2 and A.3,
while Lemma A.1 is used in the proof of Lemma A.2 and
A.3.
Lemma A.1. For all a, b ∈ [0, 1] and k1+k2 ≤ n, n ∈ Z+
and any arbitrary f : Z → R the following is true:
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n∑
k1=0
n−k1∑
k2=0
f(k1 + k2)k2
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
ak2−1bk1
−
n∑
k1=0
n−k1∑
k2=0
f(k1 + k2)k1
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
ak2bk1−1 = 0
Proof:
We can change switch the indices in the second term, i.e.,
n∑
k1=0
n−k1∑
k2=0
f(k1 + k2)k1
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
ak2bk1−1
=
n∑
k1=0
n−k1∑
k2=0
f(k1 + k2)k2
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
ak1bk2−1
Hence,
LHS =
n∑
k1=0
n−k1∑
k2=0
f(k1 + k2)k2
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
ak2−1bk1
− ak1bk2−1
)
=
n∑
k1=0
n−k1∑
k2=0
g(k1, k2) (4)
We now count the number of terms in the above equation and
show that they are even. An expression indexed by a specific
k1 and k2 denotes a term, e.g, g(1, 1) is a term. The total
number of terms in the summation =
n+1∑
i=1
i = (n+1)(n+2)2 . Out
of those, n + 1 terms are 0 due to the k2 multiplier (k2 = 0
for k1 = 0 → n). Additionally, when k2 = k1 + 1 equation
(4) is zero. The total number of terms when k2 = k1 + 1 is
given by
⌊
n+1
2
⌋
.
Since, these terms are zero, subtracting out these terms from
the total number of terms results in
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
2
− (n+ 1)−
⌊
n+ 1
2
⌋
=
n2
2
for n even
=
(n− 1)(n+ 1)
2
for n odd
Thus, the remaining terms are even for both n odd and even.
This allows us to pair the terms. Consider one such pairing: the
term with indices k1, k2 are paired with a term with indices
kˆ1, kˆ2 where kˆ2 = k1 + 1 and kˆ1 = k2 − 1. If we sum these
two terms we obtain
g(k1, k2) + g(kˆ1, kˆ2)
= f(k1 + k2)a
k2−1bk1
(
k2(k1 + k2)!
k1!k2!
−
k2(k1 + k2)!
k1!k2!
)
+ f(k1 + k2)a
k1bk2−1
(
(k1 + 1)(k1 + k2)!
(k2 − 1)!(k1 + 1)!
−
(k1 + 1)(k1 + k2)!
(k2 − 1)!(k1 + 1)!
)
= 0
Thus, the summation of the remaining terms is zero, which
completes the proof.
Lemma A.2. If T2 < T1 then ν˜ is strictly decreasing with
respect to q, i.e, dν˜
dq
< 0, ∀ q ∈ [0, 1].
Proof:
d
dq
ν˜ =
T1
∞∑
k1,k2
k1Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
k2q
k2−1r
k1
− k1q
k2r
k1−1
)
+ T2
∞∑
k1,k2
k2Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
k2q
k2−1r
k1
− k1q
k2r
k1−1
)
where r = 1− q. Let,
a1 =
∞∑
k1,k2
k1Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
k2q
k2−1r
k1
− k1q
k2r
k1−1
)
a2 =
∞∑
k1,k2
k2Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
k2q
k2−1r
k1
− k1q
k2r
k1−1
)
Adding a1 and a2 we get
a1 + a2 =
∞∑
k1,k2
(k1 + k2)Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
k2q
k2−1r
k1
− k1q
k2r
k1−1
)
Real world networks are always finite, henceQ(k1+k2) = 0
for k1+k2 > kmax, where kmax is the maximum degree. From
Lemma A.1, a1 + a2 = 0. Now we prove that a2 > 0. Let
k1 + k2 = m.
a2 =
kmax∑
m=1
Q(m)
[
1
q
m∑
k2=0
k22
(
m
k2
)
qk2rm−k2
−
1
r
m∑
k1=0
k1(m− k1)
(
m
k1
)
qm−k1rk1
]
The summations are the second moments of a binomial
random variable. E
[
X2
]
= V ar [X ] + E [X ]
2
, E[X ] =
mq, V ar[X ] = mqr.
a2 =
kmax∑
m=1
Q(m)
[
1
q
(mqr +m2q2)−
1
r
(m2r −mqr −m2r2)
]
=
kmax∑
m=1
Q(m)m
> 0
Since T2 < T1, T1a1 + T2a2 < 0, which completes the
proof.
Lemma A.3. For ψ ∈ (0, 1), if T2 < T1 then ψ is strictly
increasing with respect to q, i.e, dψ
dq
> 0, ∀ q ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: Let, ψ = g(u∗, q) where u∗ is the solution of the
fixed point equation u = f(u, q).
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Fig. 15. (Color Online) Fixed point equation, T1 = 0.7, T2 = 0.1
g(u∗, q) =
∞∑
k1,k2
α
k1β
k2P (k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
q
k2(1− q)k1
f(u, q) =
∞∑
k1,k2
α
k1β
k2Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
q
k2(1− q)k1
where α = 1+(u∗−1)T1 and β = 1+(u∗−1)T2. We first
show that the solution to the fixed point equation is strictly
increasing with q . It can be easily shown that ∂f(u,q)
∂u
> 0 and
∂2f(u,q)
∂u2
> 0 for all u, q ∈ [0, 1]. Thus f is a convex function
in u for any fixed q. Also f(0, q) > 0 for all q ∈ [0, 1].
∂f(u,q)
∂q
=
∞∑
k1,k2
α
k1β
k2Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)(
k2q
k2−1
r
k1
− k1q
k2
r
k1−1
)
= β
∞∑
k1,k2
Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
k2(βq)
k2−1(αr)k1
− α
∞∑
k1,k2
Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
k1(βq)
k2(αr)k1−1
From Lemma A.1,
∞∑
k1,k2
Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
k2(βq)
k2−1(αr)k1
−
∞∑
k1,k2
Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
k1(βq)
k2 (αr)k1−1
= 0
Now β > α because T2 < T1, which implies ∂f(u,q)∂q > 0.
Let u∗0 be the solution of the fixed point equation for some
q = q0 and let u∗1 be the solution to the fixed point equation
when q = q1 where q0 < q1. Also, u∗1 exists since we have
assumed ψ < 1.
The curve y = f(u, q1) lies above the curve y = f(u, q0)
and hence, u∗0 < f(u∗0, q1), or in other words, the curve y =
f(u, q1) has shifted above the original fixed point. Consider set
I of points u such that f(u, q1) > f(u∗0, q1), clearly u > u∗0
for all u ∈ I (as ∂f
∂u
> 0). The line y = u, ∀ u ∈ I lies above
the curve y = f(u, q0) for u ≥ u∗0 because f(u) is convex
in u and the point u = 1 is a fixed point (the line cannot be
a tangent). Since, f(u, q1) > f(u, q0), ∀ u ∈ [0, 1), there
must exist a point u∗1 belonging to set I which lies on the line
y = u, i.e., u∗1 = f(u∗1, q2). Since f(u, q) is continuous and
differentiable in u, q du
∗
dq
> 0. This is illustrated in Fig. 15.
The function g(u∗, q) has the same structure as the function
f(u, q), and hence using the same procedure it can be shown
that ∂g(u,q)
∂q
> 0. The total derivative dψ
dq
is given by:
dψ
dq
=
∂g
∂q
+
∂g
∂u
du∗
dq
Since all the terms on the right hand side of the above equation
are positive, dψ
dq
> 0.
Theorem IV.1 follows from Lemma A.2 and A.3.
Lemma A.4. For a fixed T1 and q, dψdT2 < 0 for ψ ∈ [0, 1).
Proof: Now, ψ = g(u∗, T2), u∗ is the solution to the fixed
point equation u = f(u, T2) where f and g are given by
g(u∗, T2) =
∞∑
k1,k2
α
k1β
k2P (k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
q
k2(1− q)k1
f(u, T2) =
∞∑
k1,k2
α
k1β
k2Q(k1 + k2)
(
k1 + k2
k2
)
q
k2(1− q)k1
where α = 1 + (u∗ − 1)T1 and β = 1 + (u∗ − 1)T2.
It is easy to show that ∂f
∂T2
< 0 and ∂g
∂T2
< 0. Using
arguments similar to the ones described in Lemma A.3 one
can write, du
∗
dT2
< 0. The total derivative dψ
dT2
is given by:
dψ
dT2
=
∂g
∂T2
+
∂g
∂u
du∗
dT2
Since ∂g
∂T2
< 0, du
∗
dT2
< 0 and ∂g
∂u
> 0, we have dψ
dT2
< 0.
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